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Comment
Minnesota Rails-to-Trails on the Line in
State v. Hess
Karla Vehrs*
In 1898, Thomas and Harriet Walker,' along with W.T. and
Clotilde Joyce, granted the Brainerd and Northern Minnesota
Railway Company a tract of land to be used as a "right-of-way"
for a new rail line through part of northern Minnesota. 2 The
deed described a strip of land 100-feet wide, crossing through
two counties. 3 The corridor was maintained as an active line
until 1985, when then owner, Burlington Northern Railway
Company, discontinued service on the Brainerd-BemidjiInternational Falls route. 4 In 1991, the State of Minnesota,
through the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), acquired
title to the corridor through a quitclaim deed and officially
opened the new Paul Bunyan State Trail along ninety miles of
that land. 5 As a recreational trail, the land is now used primarily for hiking, cycling, in-line skating, and snowmobiling. 6
* J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002,
University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author would like to thank editors
David Bryce and Ryan Stai, Law School Dean Alex Johnson, Professor David
Stras, and Robin Wolpert for their help and insight. Special thanks to Michael
Staab and to my parents, Van and Karen Vehrs, for their encouragement and
support.
1. Thomas Walker was born in 1840 in Ohio and came to Minnesota in
1862. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 417 n.1 (Minn. 2004). Walker purchased
vast acres of pinelands and later opened lumber mills in various locations including Crookston, Minnesota. Id. Throughout his life, Walker kept a valuable
art collection, which later formed the beginnings of the well-known Walker Art
Center in Minneapolis. Id.
2. Id. at 417.
3. The deed conveyed lands in both Cass and Hubbard counties, located
in north central Minnesota. Id. For a map of Minnesota counties, see
GEOGRAPHIC INFO. SERVS., LEGISLATIVE COORDINATING COMM'N, COUNTY

BOUNDARIES, available at http://www.commissions.leg.state.mn.us/gis/pdf/
misc/counties.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
4. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 418.
5. Id.
6. For information on the trail, see MINNESOTA DNR, PAUL BUNYAN
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In 1998, two landowners with property abutting the strip
of land began to blockade the trail, intending to build a private
driveway along the former rail line. 7 The DNR intervened in
2002, filing suit against the two property owners and obtaining
a temporary injunction.8 The parties raised the issue of
whether the 1898 Walker and Joyce deed gave the railroad an
easement, in which case the DNR most likely would not have
been able to acquire any interest in the land for trail use, or
whether it created a fee simple determinable, in which case
Minnesota law would step in to extinguish the possibility of reverter and allow the DNR full ownership of the trail.9 Both
sides moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted
the DNR's motion, concluding that it now held the land in fee
simple. 10 In State ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v.
Hess, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision, holding in the defendants' favor that the 1898 deed
granted only an easement." The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed in State v. Hess, finding that the deed granted a fee
simple determinable and that the private property owners' interest in the corridor had since been extinguished under a state
12
property statute.
Despite the media attention given to Hess as a victory for
trails enthusiasts, the future utility of the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision is questionable. Though its mission was to decide the case on the basis of the Walker and Joyce's intent in
1898, the court went to great pains to distinguish and discredit
several precedent cases, which all found railroad deeds to have
conveyed easements. 13 In cases such as Hess that must rely on
the parties' understanding of the law in a past era to accurately
discern intent, this type of approach creates a dilemma for future disputes. Courts may now be forced either to follow the

STATE TRAIL, at http://www.dnr.state.rxn.us/state-trails/paul-bunyan/index.

html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
7. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 419.

8. Id.
9. See id.
10. See State ex rel. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Hess, 665 N.W.2d 560, 563
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 684 N.W.2d 414, 427 (Minn. 2004).

11. Id. at 564.
12. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 426-27.
13. See Chi. Great W. R.R. v. Zahner, 177 N.W. 350, 351 (Minn. 1920);
Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry., 151 N.W. 907, 908 (Minn. 1915); Chambers v.
Great N. Power Co., 110 N.W. 1128, 1129-30 (Minn. 1907); see also infra Part

I.C. and table 2.
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Hess reasoning or to conform to the original intent of grantors,
thereby creating the possibility that individuals will be deprived of the real property that should lawfully belong to them.
Furthermore, by failing to state its obvious policy preference for
trails, the court created a mere temporary bandage for the Paul
Bunyan State Trail and similar rail-trails in Minnesota. As a
result of the clear inconsistencies between Hess and other relevant case law, little now stands to prevent other landowners
from rehashing the old railroad deeds relevant to their lands
and trying their odds against trail operators to win back public
rails-to-trails land for private ownership.
Minnesota is believed to have more miles of rail-trails than
nearly any other state,' 4 a factor that undoubtedly contributes
to the State's well-known recreational lifestyle and enjoyment
of the outdoors. With the potential for legal challenges to the
trails ever present, 15 this fact places Minnesota in a unique position to devise a more permanent solution to rail-trails and
serve as an example for other states facing similar difficulties.
By looking to previous cases and scholarly analysis of the issue,
the Minnesota legislature or courts should aim to establish a
set of guidelines to aid in making more principled decisions in
rails-to-trails disputes. In doing so, it is essential that the government work to maintain a satisfactory balance between traditionally strong protections for private property and the public
interest in the outdoors and recreation. A failure to find an
adequate solution will result in a disincentive to invest, fewer
new trails for Minnesota residents and tourists, and uncertainty about the future of existing trails.
Many issues raised in Hess are characteristic of the disputes that arise when old railroad lines are converted to recreational trails. 16 For that reason, Hess provides a useful starting
14. With 1301 miles, Minnesota was estimated to have more miles of railtrails than any other state. Peter Marteka, In 40 Years, New Trails Abound,
HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 22, 2003, at B3.

15.

See infra note 189.

§ 2.2 cmt. g (2000)
(pointing out that modern disputes surrounding old transportation rights-ofway often arise after the parties to the original deed are no longer available,
that the nature and value of the land at stake is often substantially different
than it was at the time the deed was created, and that disputes surrounding
these deeds often turn on whether a court interprets them to grant an easement or a fee). Other related cases have involved the so-called shifting public
uses doctrine under which courts are sometimes able to reconcile trail use
with the original railroad or transportation purpose for which the right-of-way
was intended. See, e.g., State by Wash. Wildlife Pres., Inc. v. State, 329
16.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
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point for examining creative answers to rails-to-trails challenges. In such cases, courts are often required to interpret old
conveyances that contain facially ambiguous language. 17 They
must determine the intent of the original parties to the deed
and decide which type of common law land use right or possessory estate corresponds to that intent.18 Due to often contradictory language, rails-to-trails cases are commonly subject to
multiple interpretations and are frequently reversed on appeal. 19 In addition, the ambiguity of the language, the nature of
deed construction required, and the stakes riding on these
cases often mean that courts face additional pressures from
trail users, private landowners, 20 and legislatures. 21 As a result, the State of Minnesota should consider revisiting Hess and
use it to begin an examination of what can be done to address

N.W.2d 543, 545 (Minn. 1983) (holding that use of a former railroad right-ofway for trail purposes is consistent with the original scope of the easement).
17. See, e.g., King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1084-88 (9th Cir.
2002); Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908, 911-15 (Wash. 1996); City of Manhattan
Beach v. Superior Ct., 914 P.2d 160, 164-69 (Cal. 1996); Macerich Real Estate
Co. v. City of Ames, 433 N.W.2d 726, 728-29 (Iowa 1988); McKinley v. Waterloo R.R., 368 N.W.2d 131, 136-38 (Iowa 1985); Wash. Wildlife Pres., Inc., 329
N.W.2d at 545; Moore v. Mo. Friends of the Wabash Trace Nature Trail, Inc.,
991 S.W.2d 681, 685-88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
18. For a concise account of cases that have been decided in favor of easements or fees, see A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Deed to Railroad Company as
Conveying Fee or Easement, 6 A.L.R.3d 973 (1966).
19. See, e.g., State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Minn. 2004); Brown, 924
P.2d at 911.
20. The concerns of private landowners, particularly in rural areas, include a loss of privacy, harm to wildlife, and a decrease in property values, as
well as consequences for themselves and others from trail users wandering off
the trails and onto their lands. See Richard Meryhew, Le Sueur Bike Trail Has
Fans and Fiesty Foes, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 10, 1991, at lB.
21. The National Trails System Act, for example, spells out a federal public interest in the matter by stating:
[i]n order to provide for the ever-increasing outdoor recreation needs
of an expanding population and in order to promote the preservation
of, public access to, travel within, and enjoyment and appreciation of
the open-air, outdoor areas and historic resources of the Nation, trails
should be established (i) primarily, near the urban areas of the Nation, and (ii) secondarily, within scenic areas and along historic travel
routes of the Nation, which are often more remotely located.
16 U.S.C. § 1241(a) (2000). In addition, Congress has added a rule of construction to rails-to-trails property disputes by stating that, in cases in which a
deed is determined to have conveyed merely an easement, courts should interpret usage of those easements for trails to constitute only an interim use and
not an actual abandonment of the rights-of-way for railroad purposes. See id.
§ 1247(d).
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the legal issues presented by old railroad deeds as well as the
unique public and private interests inherent to them today.
Part I of this Comment examines the history of railroads,
the rails-to-trails program, and general principles of deed construction. Part II outlines the Minnesota Supreme Court's Hess
decision and its reasoning. Part III critiques the Hess opinion,
evaluating the court's approach to interpreting the parties' intent in the 1898 deed, and Part IV examines the consequences
that interpretation will likely have for future cases. Finally,
Part V offers other possible approaches to the rails-to-trails
problem that may be more likely to achieve the court's underlying policy goals while still adhering to settled case law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SUBSEQUENT SHIFT TO TRAILS

From the mid-nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries, railroads in the United States grew and developed rapidly. In 1830, there were only twenty-three miles of railway in
the United States, 22 but by 1916 that number had grown to
254,000 miles. 23 As the industrial era blossomed and the nation's border pushed westward, railroads provided affordable
and efficient access to places not reachable by waterway. 24
Railroad companies acquired much of their land at first
through congressional grants of private condemnation authority, 25 purchased other tracts from private landowners, and won
22.

PBS AM. EXPERIENCE, STREAMLINERS: AMERICA'S LOST TRAINS, at

http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/amex/streamliners/timeline/index.html (last visited
Dec. 22, 2004).
23. Id.
24. See Emily Drumm, Note, Addressing the Flaws of the Rails-to-Trails
Act, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 158, 158-59 (1999); Robin W. Foster, Note, Rltd
Railway Corporation v. Surface Transportation Board: A JurisdictionalDerailment-Hasthe Sixth Circuit Thrown the Switch on the CongressionalPolicy of Promoting "Railbanking,"the Conversion of Abandoned Railroad Tracks
into RecreationalHiking and Biking Trails?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 601, 606 (2000).
25. Early on, state and federal lawmakers provided railroad companies

with "condemnation authority for the purpose of acquiring right-of-ways." Jef-

frey M. Heftman, Note, RailroadRight-of-way Easements, Utility Apportionments, and Shifting Technological Realities, 2002 ILL. L. REV. 1401, 1406. Under that and other legislative land-granting regimes, Congress conveyed to the
railroads approximately 90,000,000 acres. See Drumm, supra note 24, at 159.

The railroads carved rights-of-way for trains out of this land and sold much of
the remainder to private parties to promote settlement and industry. See id.

2005]

RAILS- TO-TRAILS

1549

much of the remainder from holdout property owners through
"formal condemnation proceedings." 26 To obtain land from private property owners, the railroads often negotiated with many
individuals with distinct bargaining strengths and motivations.27 The result was a haphazard set of conveyances and interests with a wide variety of granting language and intentions,
covering 272,000 miles of rail lines by the peak of the railroad
boom in 1920.28

With the advent of the automobile and the increased efficiency and convenience of truck shipping, the utility of railroads declined quickly. 29 As of 1989, only 141,000 miles of train
lines were still in use. 30 Estimates predicted the rate of decline
would continue at the pace of approximately 3000 miles annu31
ally through 2000.

In 1968, Congress began to pave the way for future trails
policies by passing the National Trails System Act, which defined a federal interest in encouraging outdoor recreation and
appreciation of scenic and historic routes. 32 Then in 1976 Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, 33 intending to prevent permanent loss of railroad

rights-of-way through conversion to trails. 34 However, because
the responsible government agencies failed to act with sufficient speed to convert abandoned35lines into trails, many opportunities for conversion were lost.

The goal was to create business along the newly forming corridors. Id.
26. Jill K. Pearson, Note, BalancingPrivate Property Rights with Public
Interests: CompensatingLandowners for the Use of Railroad Corridorsfor Fiber-Optic Technology, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1772-73 (2000).
27. See id.; see also Gregg H. Hirakawa, Comment, Preserving Transportation Corridorsfor the Future:Another Look at RailroadDeeds in Washington
State, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 481, 486 (2001) (describing the process by which
some railroad representatives would knock on landowners' doors with "form
deeds in hand" and give them the option of either selling their land outright or
having it seized under eminent domain).
28. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990).
29. See Hirakawa, supra note 27, at 487.
30. Id. at 488.
31. Preseault,494 U.S. at 5.
32. National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2000)); see also Drumm, supra note 24, at 160.
33. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act),
Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 801-836
(2000)).
34. Preseault,494 U.S. at 5-6.
35. See H.R. REP. No. 98-28, at 2 (1983); see also Preseault,494 U.S. at 5-
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This led Congress to pass the National Trails System Act
Amendments of 1983.36 As an alternative to outright abandonment, Congress used the amendments to establish an "interim"
or temporary designation specifically for trail use, so long as
"the route itself remains intact for future railroad purposes." 37
Procedurally, the amendments authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission (now the Surface Transportation Board) to
withhold right-of-way "abandonment" labels,3 8 which are otherwise required by regulation for relieving railroads of their accountability for a line,3 9 when a government or private entity is

willing to assume responsibility for the corridors and operate
them as recreational trails.40 By creating an "interim" designation, the amendments allow trail operators to circumvent restrictive language in deeds that otherwise would clearly extinguish railroads' right or estate upon abandonment of a right-ofway for railroad purposes. 4 1
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR INTERPRETING RAILROAD DEEDS

State and federal courts must regularly discern the nature
and scope of the property interests acquired by railroads in the
distant past. Such disputes commonly arise in rails-to-trails
cases, utility easement challenges, and other related quiet title
actions in which surrounding landowners seek a determination
that they are the rightful titleholders to such lands. The types
of land interests and rights established through railroad deeds
may range from fee simple absolute to easements. 42 While a fee
simple absolute is the most complete form of land ownership,
courts have most commonly found railroads' land interests to
consist of either a fee simple determinable or an easement. 43
6 (noting that by 1983, Congress recognized that the 4-R Act had not been successful in converting abandoned rail lines to recreational trails).
36. National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11,
97 Stat. 42 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2000)).
37. H.R. REP. No. 98-29, at 8.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000).
39. See OFFICE OF PUB. SERVS., SURFACE TRANSP. BD., OVERVIEW:
ABANDONMENTS & ALTERNATIVES TO ABANDONMENT 4 (1997), available at

http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/docs/Abandonments%20and%20Alternatives.pdf
(last visited Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter STB ABANDONMENTS OVERVIEW].
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).
41. See id.
42.

7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 60.03(a)(7)(iii)

(David A. Thomas ed., 1994). An overview of the principles contained in this
section can be found infra in table 1.
43. See id.
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Although the rights accompanying a fee simple determinable
differ greatly from those of an easement, the two may appear
very similar when a purpose is specified for a land conveyance.
"A 'determinable fee' has been defined as a fee-simple estate to
a person and his heirs, with a qualification annexed providing
that it must terminate whenever the qualification is at an
end." 44 An easement, on the other hand, "is a right to make use
of the land of another for some definite and limited purpose or
45
purposes."
Two main reasons exist for the difficulties that courts face
in deciding what type of property interest a deed conveyed to
railroads. First, state laws supply the substantive standards
that courts must use in interpreting railroad conveyances or
any other property law issues. 46 Because state laws vary
greatly, the result has been widespread "diversity of treatment
of such cases." 47 Second, due to the nature and speed with
which many thousands of miles of railroad rights-of-way were
pieced together, such deeds often differ significantly in their
choice of language and detail.4 8 Despite these hindrances, however, the sizeable body of railroad conveyance case law has resulted in a number of commonly discernable rules of interpreta49
tion.
The most important principle for interpreting deeds, as
well as contracts generally, dictates that when attempting to
determine the nature of the interests created by a deed, courts
first "look to the deed to ascertain and give effect to the inten50
tion of the parties to the instrument." In doing so, courts must
consider the entirety of the writing, not merely disjointed parts
of it.51 If the language of the instrument is ambiguous, a court

44. 2 THOMPSON, supra note 42, § 20.02, at 834.
45. WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 282 (2d
ed. 1937).
46. Heftman, supra note 25, at 1407.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See generally Korpela, supra note 18 (outlining general rules of interpretation that have developed for railroad deeds and describing cases from
around the United States that have resulted in a variety of interpretations
and outcomes); see also infra table 1.
50. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn. 2004) (citing Consol. Sch.
Dist. No. 102 v. Walter, 66 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn. 1954); Sec. Trust Co. v.
Joesting, 104 N.W. 830, 831-32 (Minn. 1905)).
51. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423 (citing Sec. Trust Co., 104 N.W. at 832); see
also 15 DUNNELL MINN. DIG. Deeds § 1.11(b), at 348 (4th ed., 1992).
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may then look to extrinsic evidence to better discern the intent
of the parties. 52 However, because courts must necessarily interpret the intent of old deeds that relied upon the contemporaneous state of the law, "settled rules of construction should
have more weight than a court's conjecture as to the intent of
the parties."53
Table 1: Overview of Common Railroad Deed
Interpretation Principles
Deed Element

Language
Favoring Fee
Simple Finding

Language
Favoring
Easement
Finding

Purpose for
conveyance
Nature of land or
right-of-way

Grant of land to
railroad
More
conventionally
shaped plot of land
or right; notable
resale value
independent of

"For a railroad
right-of-way"
Long, narrow
right-of-way; of
little use to anyone other than
railroad at time
of conveyance

surrounding land

Consideration

Bargaining
strength

Substantial
consideration,
presumably near
market value
Grantor capable of
arm's-length
bargaining with
railroad

Little or nominal
consideration
Railroad with
superior drafting
sophistication
and grantor with
less bargaining
strength

1. Purpose for Conveyance
A major issue courts address in interpreting railway deeds
concerns the stated purpose of the grant, such as for right-of52. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423 (citing Sec. Trust Co., 104 N.W. at 832); 15

DUNNELL MINN. DIG., supra note 51, § 1.11(b), at 348.
53. 15 DUNNELLMINN. DIG., supra note 51, § 1.11(a), at 347.
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way or railway purposes. When a purpose for the conveyance is
expressed in a deed, some courts have held the statement to be
"merely descriptive of the use to which the land is to be put
54
[with] no effect to limit or restrict the estate conveyed." Howdisplays an unever, others have found that such a limitation
55
easement.
mere
a
convey
to
intent
equivocal
In cases in which the stated purpose is for a "right-of-way,"
the most common interpretation is that the parties intended to
create an easement. 56 This presumption is strengthened by
substantial authority which points out that even in cases containing a habendum clause 57 with language such as "to the
grantee, her heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple," an easement was nonetheless intended. 58 At the same time, however,
many courts have also taken note of an 1891 Supreme Court
case, 59 in which Justice Samuel Blatchford stated that the term
"right-of-way" can have two distinct meanings: "It sometimes is
used to describe a right belonging to a party, a right of passage
over any tract; and it is also used to describe that strip of land
which railroad companies take upon which to construct their
road-bed."6 0 Despite this dual meaning, a "right" or "right-ofway" is generally held to be indicative of an easement, whereas
61
a grant of actual "land" commonly denotes a fee simple. Those
interpretacases that rely on Justice Blatchford's alternative
conflicting
tion generally do so to reconcile such language 6with
2
result.
uniform
a
obtain
to
and
parts of the deed

54.

See Korpela, supra note 18, § 3a.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. A habendum clause is defined as "[t]he part of an instrument, such as
being granted and any
conditions affecting the grant. The introductory words to the clause are ordinarily to have and to hold." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).
58. Korpela, supra note 18, § 3a. For example, in the Washington case of
Brown v. State, the dissenting judge stated that "in cases where the granting
clause of a deed declares the purpose of a grant to be a right-of-way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement only, not a fee, though it be in the usual
form of a full warranty deed." 924 P.2d 908, 919 (Wash. 1996) (Sanders, J.,

a deed or will, that defines the extent of the interest

dissenting) (citations omitted).

59. See, e.g., Severns v. Union Pac. R.R., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 105 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Rabold, 691 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998).
60. Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 44 (1891).

61.
62.

Korpela, supranote 18, § 3a.
See, e.g., infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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Courts also consider other factors relating to the purpose of
a conveyance. For example, they may examine whether the
grantor reserved the right to use any of the land at issue. Language reserving such a .right would create a presumption in favor of an easement. 63 Additionally, the specified mode of transportation for which the deed was created can be of significance
due to the distinct nature of such grantees. If the conveyance is
for the creation of a street or highway and the land is thus conveyed to a public entity, a presumption exists in favor of a fee
simple estate. 64 This is because operable laws often specify that
land used for public streets and subsequently abandoned must
return to adjoining land parcels, creating little risk for landowners in simply granting a fee simple absolute for use as a
street. 65 In the case of conveyances to private railroad companies, however, "the frequency with which railroad uses have
been abandoned" 66 is a key factor in concluding that most reasonable grantors would only intend to convey an easement. 67
2. Nature of the Land or Right-of-way
The type and location of the right-of-way create an additional set of presumptions. For example, the width of the land
granted has been found relevant to determining the intent of
the original grantor. 68 Long and narrow rights-of-way that were
pieced together specifically for railroad purposes were generally
of little or no value to anyone but railroad operators at the time
of the original conveyance. 69 These may therefore create a presumption that an easement was intended so that the strip may

63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.2 cmt. g (2000).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Presumably this distinction is based on the perceived permanence
of each mode of transportation. However, this prompts the question of how
courts will interpret conveyances to municipalities for street use many years
from now when humans will perhaps rely on something other than streets and
motor vehicles for transportation and such land use will no longer be advantageous.
68. See, e.g., In re Chi. & N.W. Ry., 127 F.2d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 1942);
Daugherty v. Helena & N.W. Ry., 252 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Ark. 1952); Norton v.
Duluth Transfer Ry., 151 N.W. 907, 908 (Minn. 1915).
69. Cf. Heftman, supra note 25, at 1410-11 (discussing the use of railway
corridors for fiber optic cables, which require the type of linear placement best
found in railroad easements).
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be rejoined with the dominant estate upon termination of rail70
road usage and form a more valuable tract of land.
3. Valuable Consideration
On occasion courts also examine how much consideration
was paid for the right-of-way or strip of land, though many are
cautious not to overly emphasize this element for a variety of
reasons. Generally speaking, evidence that the grantee paid
market value for the land may suggest the creation of a fee
simple interest, and evidence of little or nominal consideration
may indicate an easement.7 1 However, in analyzing the effect of
the stated consideration, one should also consider other factors
that might have impacted the amount. These could include the
motivation of the grantor, the use to which the land was previously devoted, or whether the particular grantor had reason to
72
state a greater or lesser amount than actually received. For
example, if a grantor stood to benefit his business or industry
with the presence of a rail line, he might have been willing to
accept less consideration at the outset in exchange for "proximity to a functioning railroad." 73 Unfortunately for later deed
interpretation, these external factors seldom appear in the language of the deed.
On the other side of the issue, a statement of little or
nominal consideration might be equally as inconclusive in some
cases. A property law treatise contemporaneous to the 1898
deed noted that, "[a]s between the parties to a deed at the present day, no consideration, expressed or unexpressed, is necessary," and that "[a] deed of conveyance ...operates to pass the

title, as between the parties, as effectually as if it had been
74
made for an adequate valuable consideration." For that reason, a statement of nominal consideration may not represent

70. Korpela, supra note 18, § 3b.
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.2 cmt. g (2000).
72. See, e.g., Ala. & Vicksburg Ry. v. Mashburn, 109 So. 2d 533, 536 (Miss.
1959).
73.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.2 cmt. g (2000); cf.

Drumm, supra note 24, at 159 (noting the ability of railroads to sell land along
new developing rail lines to 'lure settlers and future customers" and in turn
increase their own business). The simultaneous boom of both the railroad network and railway towns points strongly to the economic benefit experienced by
both producers of goods and the railroad companies.
74. 1 LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 266 (1896).
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the actual amount paid for the right or land interest, and such
a clause may therefore be of little aid in interpreting the deed.
4.

Contract Principles Applicable to Deed Interpretation
Finally, most standard rules of contract interpretation are
also relevant to railroad deeds. For instance, "[the superior sophistication and drafting opportunity of the railroad vis-a-vis
the grantor may buttress th[e] conclusion" that the instrument
was intended to convey an easement rather than an estate in
75
land.

In addition, the construction given to the deed by the

parties themselves speaks directly to their intent in drafting
such a deed. 76 In some cases, courts may find direct evidence of
such intent in later deeds from the same grantor relating to the
77
same or nearby land.

C. MINNESOTA CASES INTERPRETING RAILROAD CONVEYANCES

Four main Minnesota cases addressed right-of-way conveyances to railroad companies prior to Hess.78 First, Chambers
v. Great Northern Power Co., decided in 1907, inquired into
"the nature of the title acquired by the railroad company
[through] condemnation proceedings." 79 Here, the court's
analysis focused predominantly on the type of estate that a
railroad was able to attain through a legislatively authorized
exercise of eminent domain.8 0 The court held that, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent, "[t]he language employed... clearly imports that a mere easement was granted
for so long a time as the land should be occupied and used for
the purpose of operating a railroad."8'
The Minnesota Supreme Court then decided Norton v. Duluth Transfer Railway Co. in 1915.82 Norton required the court
first to decide whether a deed from a private landowner to the
railroad company created a fee simple or an easement.8 3 The
75.
76.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.2 cmt. g (2000).
15 DUNNELL MINN. DIG., supra note 51, § 1.11(e), at 349.

77. See, e.g., State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 426 (Minn. 2004) (analyzing
the effect of a subsequent deed from the original grantors three years after the
railroad deed was executed).
78. For a brief comparison of precedent cases and Hess, see infra table 2.
79. Chambers v. Great N. Power Co., 110 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Minn. 1907).
80. See id. at 1129-30.
81. Id.
82. 151 N.W. 907 (Minn. 1915).
83. Id. at 908.
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court held that the deed created an easement, noting factors
such as "so long as" in the granting clause, the width of the
right-of-way, the stated purpose for the grant, and the absence
of "forever" in the habendum clause.8 4 Additionally, the court
held that the railroad company abandoned the rail line when it
ceased operation on the line for ten years and removed its track
from the land in question. 85
The third case, Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. v.
Zahner, was decided in 1920 and again raised the issue of
whether a deed to a railroad created a fee simple or an easement.8 6 The court discussed the limited width of the right-ofway, the warranty deed with which the strip was conveyed, and
the purpose to which the land was to be put.8 7 Without engag-

ing in significant analysis, the court held that "[w]ithin the
principle of our holdings there was no intent to grant a fee, but
easement, which
an intent to grant a railroad right-of-way
88
abandonment."
upon
revert
would
The final case, State by Washington Wildlife Preservation,
Inc. v. State, required the construction of fourteen individual
deeds pertaining to nearly ten miles of a former railroad rightof-way that had been converted for trail use.8 9 However, because the resolution of the fee simple versus easement issue
was unnecessary, the court avoided the question altogether and
held that, regardless of what interests were created in the railroad, the original language was broad enough to allow for application of the so-called shifting public uses doctrine: "[u]se of
the right-of-way as a recreational trail is consistent with the
purpose for which the easement was originally acquired, public
travel, and it imposes no additional burden on the servient estates."90 Thus, prior to Hess, the Minnesota Supreme Court had
never interpreted a conveyance to a railroad to have passed in
fee. In each case, the court either expressly found that the railroad had acquired an easement or bypassed the question because of its irrelevance to the resolution of the case.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
(Minn.

Id.
Id. at 909.
Chi. Great W. R.R. v. Zahner, 177 N.W. 350, 350-51 (Minn. 1920).
Id. at 350.
Id. (citations omitted).
State by Wash. Wildlife Pres., Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543, 544-45
1983).

90. Id. at 545.
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Table 2: Comparison of Deed Elements in State v. Hess
and Relevant Precedent
Chambers
v. Great
Northern
Power Co.

Norton v.
Duluth
Transfer
Railway
Co.

Land or
right
conveyed

"All such
lands within
the limits of
the line of
such
railroad"

"All that
tract or
parcel of
land"

Purpose
for conveyance

"For such
purposes to
be by them
held and
possessed"

"For rightof-way
purposes"

Limiting
language

"So long as
the same
shall be used
for such
purposes"

Width of
land or
right-ofway

Two
hundred feet
in width

"So long as
the same
shall be
used as a
right-ofway...
and a
railroad
way''
Seventyfive feet
wide

Holding

Easement

Easement

Chicago
Great
Western
Railroad
Co. v.
Zahner
"Portions
of lots
three and
four"

State v. Hess

"To be
used for a
track ....
on said
land for
commercial purposes"

"For right-ofway and for
railway
purposes"

"Strip, belt, or
piece of land"

"[So] long as
the said strips
of land shall
be used for
Right-of-way
and for
Railway
puposes"
Within
fifty feet
of the rails
of the spur

One hundred
feet-wide

Easement

Fee simple
determinable
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D. MINNESOTA'S MARKETABLE TITLE ACT

While resolution of the defeasible fee versus easement issue was not necessarily decisive in past cases, the Marketable
Title Act launched the issue to the forefront, causing defeasible
fees to have a vastly different effect than easements in certain
cases. Adopted in 1943, the Act sets forth "the policy of the
state of Minnesota that, except as herein provided, ancient re91
cords shall not fetter the marketability of real estate." The
Act provides that no person may claim to have an outstanding
interest in land, such as a possibility of reverter, if that interest
92
has been in existence for over forty years. The only way to
avoid operation of the statute is to record that interest and the
county recorder in the
purported basis for its existence with the
93
same manner as one would record title.
When a litigant seeks to invoke the Marketable Title Act,
94
Minnesota courts follow a two-prong test. First, the party
seeking to use the Marketable Title Act to his benefit must
95
have a fee simple title of record for at least forty years. Second, the party against whom the Act is sought to be enforced
must have demonstrated conclusive evidence of abandonment
of "all right, claim, interest, incumbrance or lien" in the property. 96 If a court determines that this test has been satisfied,
the Act extinguishes the outstanding interest in the real property and grants the fee owner unfettered title.
The goal of the Act is to conclusively determine the status
of all interests in real property by searching all title records up
to forty years old, avoiding the "cumbersome and uncertain"
97
process of an unlimited title search. However, because its application is limited to a "source of title," the Act affects only
possessory estates and has no impact on lesser rights such as
easements or licenses. 98 The practical impact is that, where a
party's estate might have otherwise been for a limited purpose
only, the passage of forty years and the failure of the opposing
party to record his or her reversionary interest results in a de91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
(Minn.
98.

MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 5 (2000).
See id. § 541.023, subd. 1.
See id.
Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800, 819 (Minn. 1957).
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 5 (2000); Wichelman, 83 N.W.2d at 819.
Hersh Properties, LLC v. McDonald's Corp., 588 N.W.2d 728, 732
1999).
MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 7 (2000).
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feasible fee becoming a fee simple absolute. As applied to railsto-trails disputes, a finding that an original deed created a fee
simple determinable now often allows a trail to go forward as a
fee simple absolute. On the other hand, a finding of an easement typically gives rise to a secondary analysis, such as in
State by Washington Wildlife Preservation,Inc. v. State,99 as to
whether the scope of the easement might encompass trail
use. 100 Consequently, courts' determinations as to the nature of
ancient railroad deeds, in conjunction with the Marketable Title Act, now have a major impact on the outcome of rails-totrails cases.
II. REASONING AND HOLDING IN STATE V HESS
The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Hess analyzed
whether the 1898 deed from the Walkers and Joyces to the railroad company created a fee simple determinable or an easement. 10 1 Because no Minnesota case has established a uniform
summary of the principles with which to evaluate disputes concerning old railroad conveyances, the court undertook an examination of several elements within and without the 1898
deed.1 02 The court ultimately reached the conclusion that the
railroad, and thus the DNR, received a fee simple determinable
to the corridor, and that the failure of the abutting landowners
to record their possibility of reverter in the property resulted in
that interest being extinguished under the Marketable Title
Act.103

The Hess court began its analysis with a discussion of prior
case law interpreting railroad deeds. 104 The three cases upon
which it relied all resulted in the conclusion that the deeds created easements, rather than fees. 0 5 The court sought to distinguish all three from Hess by pointing out that in none of those
cases was the fee simple versus easement decision "material to
the outcome of the cases,"'106 and that their conclusions there99. 329 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1983).
100. See id. at 546-47.
101. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Minn. 2004).
102. Id. at 423-26.
103. Id. at 426-27.
104. Id. at 420-21; see discussion supraPart I.C.
105. See Chi. Great W. R.R. v. Zahner, 177 N.W. 350, 351 (Minn. 1920);
Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry., 151 N.W. 907, 908 (Minn. 1915); Chambers v.
Great N. Power Co., 110 N.W. 1128, 1129-30 (Minn. 1907).
106. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 421.
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fore were not binding. In addition, the court noted that the
zeitgeist10 7 of the early twentieth century included an "antirailroad animus [that] caused many courts to hold that all ambiguities and presumptions were to be resolved in favor of the
grantor landowners."'108 The court also argued that turn-of-thecentury courts "imposed a binary structure on railroad title
disputes"'109 to support its view that courts in that time period
erred in failing to consider that railroad deeds might have created other interests, such as defeasible fees. 110
Next, the court discussed the Marketable Title Act, pointing out that it now makes the fee simple versus easement determination material to the outcome of such cases."' In a footnote, the court again drew a parallel between laws such as the
Marketable Title Act and "a strong public interest ...

in pre-

serving [rail] corridors for trails and utilities." 112 According to
the court's argument, deciding cases such as Hess in favor of
the railroad or its assigns conforms to the parties' expectations
when the original parties to the deed are deceased and the cor113
ridor is still of some use.
The court then turned to the 1898 deed, recognizing that
determinations of the type of conveyance made in railroad
deeds "usually turn on a case-by-case examination of each
deed." 114 Its discussion included analysis of several different
aspects of the deed: the language specifying that "strips of
land" were granted; 115 the inclusion of "so long as" in the limiting language of the habendum clause; 116 the use of the phrase
"for Right-of-way and for Railway Purposes"; 117 the width of the
strip of land;"18 the provision allowing for the placement of
107. Zeitgeist is defined as "the general intellectual, moral, and cultural
climate of an era." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1456 (11th
ed. 2003).
108. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 421 n.6 (quoting Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M.
Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the
Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First
Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 377 (2000)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 422; see discussion supra Part I.D.
112. Id. at 422 n.7 (quoting Wright & Hester, supra note 108, at 385).
113. See id.
114. Id. at 423.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 423-24.
117. Id. at 424.
118. Id. at 425.
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snow fences outside the borders of the deeded land;" l9 the relinquishment of dower rights specified in the deed;120 and the
original parties' treatment of the conveyance in a future
deed.121
Relying on these factors, the court found that the deed created a fee simple determinable in favor of the railroad. First, it
noted that the deed conveyed "land rather than mere use of the
land," a factor which according to common interpretation standards gives rise to a presumption of a fee interest. 122 Second,
the court held that "the use of the phrase 'so long as' in the habendum clause provides clear evidence of the grantors' intent to
convey a determinable fee because the phrase 'so long as' is
123
typically used in a conveyance of a fee simple determinable."'
In analyzing the phrase "right-of-way," the court ulti124
mately found its inclusion in the deed to be inconclusive.
While the court did note that use of the phrase "has been frequently cited as evidence that a conveyance is an easement," it
disregarded this common rule as "not necessarily" indicative of
that conclusion.125 The court relied upon Justice Blatchford's
secondary meaning of "right-of-way" as a phrase merely describing the property being conveyed and further cited a recent
Iowa case holding that all such conveyances, whether intended
26
to be a fee or an easement, will have a similar purpose.
The court discussed the remaining elements of the deed
that contributed to its decision in less depth. It noted that the
legal description of the land in the 1898 deed defined it as "100
feet in width"'127 and went on to analyze a provision for snow
128 It
fences alongside the 100-foot strip for the right-of-way.
concluded that, since the language allowing for the snow fences
was different from that conveying the land or right-of-way for
the railroad itself, the only possible conclusion was that the

119. Id.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 423; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 424-25 (citing Lowers v. United States, 663 N.W.2d 408, 410-11

(Iowa 2003)).
127. Id. at 425.
128. Id.
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provision for the right-of-way created a fee while the provision
129
for snow fences created an easement.
The court also briefly analyzed the relinquishment of
dower rights provided for in the deed. It concluded that this
clause would have been meaningless if the parties had intended
to create merely an easement, and that its inclusion in the deed
130
therefore provides further evidence in favor of a fee interest.
The only case law the court cited in support of this notion, however, was a 1989 Arkansas case, which determined that the
deeds at issue conveyed mere easements despite the relinquishment of dower rights. 131
Finally, the court noted that a 1901 deed from the same
grantor that conveyed land adjacent to the railroad right-ofway specifically "except[ed] and reserve[ed] therefrom the land
heretobefore conveyed to the Park Rapids and Leech Lake
Railway and to the Brainerd and Northern Minnesota Railway
for right-of-way."'132 It determined that by including this clause
in a subsequent deed, the parties to the 1898 deed understood
that they no longer possessed any rights in the railroad's strip
33
of land.1
Upon reaching the conclusion that the 1898 deed created a
fee simple determinable, the court applied the Marketable Title
34
Act to the surrounding landowners' possibility of reverter
Because the landowners failed to record their interests in that
land within the requisite forty-year period, the court determined that they had given up their claim to the land and that
the DNR held title to the Paul Bunyan State Trail in fee simple
absolute. 135
III. THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE ORIGINAL
PARTIES' INTENT
Though claiming to be consistent with precedent, the Minnesota Supreme Court's examination of the deed, the surrounding circumstances, and relevant case law reveal a clear policy

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.; see Brewer & Taylor Co. v. Wall, 769 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Ark. 1989);
see also Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 431 (Blatz, C.J., dissenting).
132. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 426.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 426-27.
135. Id. at 427.

1564

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:1544

preference in favor of the trail. 136 The court analyzed elements
of the deed capable of interpretation as a fee simple determinable and distinguished them from similar analysis in precedent
cases by discrediting the precedent as incomplete and uninformed. In addition, the court adopted a myopic view of external circumstances to determine that the parties intended to
create a fee simple determinable rather than an easement. A
closer look at precedent, the language of the deed, and the surrounding facts, reveals that the court misinterpreted the original intent of the 1898 deed and arrived at the wrong legal conclusion. While this outcome may have served an important
public interest in saving the Paul Bunyan State Trail, the
court's deviation from settled law is troubling and will likely
have the unforeseen effect of forcing courts in future cases either to decide in favor of the original parties' intent or to follow
its Hess ruling.
A. THE COURT'S DISREGARD FOR CASE LAW PRECEDENT
MISPLACES ORIGINAL INTENT
The Minnesota Supreme Court's approach to precedent
case law in State v. Hess disregards past courts' understandings of property law and, specifically, railroad conveyances. For
areas of the law such as property law, which are heavily based
on early common law tradition and evolving usages, contemporaneous court decisions are often the best source from which to
discern the common understanding of the law in a past time
period. While such an understanding may only serve to illustrate historical narratives in other fields of law, it remains of
crucial importance in property law. Only by examining the
meaning that contemporaneous individuals gave to similar
deed language can one determine with any certainty what type
of interest the parties intended to create.
The first case discussed in Hess on the issue of easement
versus fee simple is Chambers v. Great Northern Power Co.137
The Hess court notes only that the right-of-way acquired
through condemnation proceedings in that case was determined to be an easement and then argues that the distinction
between an easement and a fee simple was ultimately irrele-

136. See id.
137. 110 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Minn. 1907); see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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vant to the case's outcome. 138 Such a discussion of Chambers is
misleading for two reasons. First, the Hess court gives the appearance that this case should not be controlling because the
finding of an easement was merely dicta. 139 A closer look at
that case, however, reveals that the Chambers court divided its
analysis into two distinct sections and arrived at two clearly
stated conclusions, the first being that an easement was cre40
ated.
More importantly, after finding that the deed at issue created an easement, the Chambers court said, "[n]o reason occurs
to us why any distinction should be made in the nature of the
title granted by the state of its own lands and the title to be acquired from private owners." 14 1 The court's reasoning thereby
reveals a significant, underlying premise of railroad deeds: because private landowners did not convey anything but easements for railroad rights-of-way, neither should courts interpret conveyances from public lands as anything greater than
easements. The failure of the Hess court to address this presumption weakens its ultimate conclusion that the original
grantors intended to create something greater than an easement.
The next case discussed in Hess is Norton v. Duluth Transfer Railway Co. 142 The Hess court's approach to this case is par-

ticularly noteworthy because it focuses most strongly on the
losing party's argument that the deed created "an absolute fee
title limited only as to use, namely, railroad right-of-way purposes."'1 43 Only after the Hess court sets forth this argument

does it note that the holding in Norton found the deed to convey
an easement rather than a fee simple. 44 The Hess court claims
that the "absolute fee title" subject to a specific purpose advocated by the appellants in Norton might have caused the Norton court to consider only the distinction between a fee simple
absolute and an easement, thereby ignoring the obvious possibility of a fee simple determinable. 145 This, however, ignores
the plain fact that a fee simple determinable is a fee interest
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420.
See id.
Chambers, 110 N.W. at 1129-30.
Id. at 1130.
Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry., 151 N.W. 907 (Minn. 1915).
Id. at 908.
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420.
Id. at 421 n.6.
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subject to a specific purpose, which demonstrates that the Norton court did in fact consider the argument but rejected it in favor of an easement. 146

Additionally, the Hess court attempts to discredit the holding in Norton by noting that the distinction between an easement and a fee simple determinable was technically irrelevant
to the outcome of the case. 147 This disregard for the Norton
finding is simply not supported by the plain language of the
opinion: "A reading of the [conveyance] leaves in our minds no
fair doubt of the intention of the parties.... The only conclusion, as it seems to us, is that the parties intended... to convey
to the company an easement only."'148 Regardless of whether
this language is considered a holding or dicta, i nonetheless
represents the Minnesota Supreme Court's clear understanding
of the law of railroad conveyances at that time.
The final case that the court distinguishes from Hess is
Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. v. Zahner.149 The Zahner
court determined as well that the deed at issue conveyed an
easement rather than a fee.' 50 Again, the Hess court distinguishes this from the case at hand by pointing out that Zahner
never considered the possibility of a fee simple determinable,
and that even if it had, such a distinction would have been
meaningless to the underlying issue in the case.15 1 As with the
previous two cases, however, it is inappropriate for the Hess
court to disregard these holdings as mere dicta. In Zahner, as
in Norton, the court clearly begins its opinion by noting that
there are two questions before it for consideration, one of them
being "[w]hether a deed to the plaintiff railroad company conveyed the fee or a railroad right-of-way easement."'152 The Zahner court accordingly broke down its analysis between the two
distinct issues and arrived at holdings for each. 153 The Hess
146. "A base or determinable fee may be created to continue so long as the
land is devoted to a particular use, such as a conveyance of particularly described real estate 'to be used for railroad purposes only,' or for church purposes." 2 THOMPSON, supra note 42, § 20.02, at 839 (quoting Epworth Assembly v. Ludington & N. Ry., 211 N.W. 99 (Mich. 1926)); see also Hess, 684
N.W.2d at 430 (Blatz, C.J., dissenting).
147. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 421.
148. Norton, 151 N.W. at 908.
149. Chi. Great W. R.R. v. Zahner, 177 N.W. 350 (Minn. 1920).
150. Id.
151. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420-21.
152. Zahner, 177 N.W. at 350.
153. Id. at 351-52.
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court's struggle to distinguish precedent is ultimately unconvincing in light of the plain similarities between the Hess deed
and those at issue in the prior cases.
B. THE STATE OF THE FEE SIMPLE DETERMINABLE AT THE TIME
OF THE 1898 DEED
The Hess court did not explicitly overrule Chambers, Norton, and Zahner, but it nonetheless took an unmistakable
stance that those opinions had erred in not adequately considering the possibility that the deeds created fees simple determinable. This position might not be noteworthy, but for the fact
that the court's stated goal in Hess was "to ascertain and give
154
effect to the intention of the parties to the instrument."'
Whatever the current understanding of the law of property interests may be, the job of the court was to determine the parties' expectations over 100 years ago. Chambers, Norton, and
Zahner, which interpreted contemporaneous conveyances and
were decided in the years following the creation of the 1898
deed, all found easements to have been created and each exemplified the conventional expectations of railroad deeds during
that time period. 155 As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court's
decision in Hess misapplies the law as it stood in 1898 and fails
to uphold the original intent of the deed.
Various pieces of evidence appear in case law and scholarly
works supporting the notion that easements are the more likely
interpretation of most railroad deeds. As noted above, the
Chambers case-the earliest of the three Minnesota casesstates that land conveyances to railroads, whether from the
state or from private parties, passed no more than an easement. 156 This position is supported by the fact that Chambers,
Norton, and Zahner all found the railroad conveyances at issue
to be easements. 57 Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court
154. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423.
155. The title at issue in Chambers was founded upon condemnation proceedings that took place in 1869 and the case was decided in 1907. Chambers
v. Great N. Power Co., 110 N.W. 1128, 1128 (Minn. 1907). In Norton, the court
did not explicitly state in which year the deed was issued, but from the facts
that it did state, the right-of-way was clearly granted sometime prior to 1896;
the court decided the case in 1915. Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry., 151 N.W.
907, 907 (Minn. 1915). And in Zahner, the right-of-way deed was issued in
1905 and the case was decided in 1920. Zahner, 177 N.W. at 350.
156. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
157. For discussion of the Chambers, Norton, and Zahner holdings, see supranotes 79-88 and accompanying text.
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again confirmed Norton and Zahner in a 1954 case, noting that
"[iun both cases a railroad right-of-way was involved and the
court properly gave effect to the unmistakable intent of the
parties." 158 Hess is thus the first and only case from the Minnesota Supreme Court to find that a grant to a railroad conveyed
a fee title.
It is also commonly known that by 1900 many courts had
adopted a simplified view of the law relating to railroad land
interests, considering fees simple absolute and easements to be
the only possible constructions of railroad deeds. 159 One need
not look further than Chambers, Norton, and Zahner for evidence of this limited view. 160 In addition, John C. Gray's
prominent nineteenth- and early twentieth-century treatise on
the rule against perpetuities argued that the Statute of Quia
Emptores had essentially done away with the determinable
fee.' 6 1 The same sentiment is reflected in George W. Thompson's 1930 property treatise, which states that "[determinable]
estates are recognized [only] in some states."' 62 Consequently,
absent compelling evidence of intent to create a fee simple, it is
unlikely that the original parties intended for the 1898 deed to
be interpreted as anything but an easement.
C. THE PROPER RESULT FOR THE 1898 DEED IN LIGHT OF
NORTON AND ZAHNER

However willing landowners may or may not have been at
the end of the nineteenth century to grant a fee simple determinable for a railroad right-of-way, it remains imperative that
courts evaluate each deed individually to discern the original
parties' intent. Nevertheless, an examination of various deed
elements mentioned in Norton and Zahner as compared with
their treatment in Hess reveals that the supposed intent of the
original grantors in Hess cannot be easily reconciled with the
intent afforded to similarly situated grantors in Norton and
158. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 102 v. Walter, 66 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn. 1954).
159. Wright & Hester, supra note 108, at 377. The authors attribute this to
an "anti-railroad animus" in the courts during the time period. Id. However,
courts may have felt justified in taking this stance given the railroads' often
invasive practices in obtaining land. See supra note 27.
160. See discussion supra Part I.C.
161. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 20-23,
(4th ed. 1942); see also 2 THOMPSON, supra note 42, § 20.02, at 832 n.101.
162. GEORGE W. THOMPSON, A PRAcTIcAL TREATISE ON ABSTRACTS AND
TITLES WITH FORMS § 43, at 60 (2d ed. 1930).
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Zahner. Regardless of whether one believes that Norton and
Zahner were decided correctly, their precedent is of undeniable
value in forming a clearer picture of how the law of railroad
deeds was understood in that time period. In addition, analysis
of various unique elements of the Hess deed as compared with
treatment of those subjects in contemporaneous property treatises points to the conclusion that the original grantors most
likely intended to create an easement.
1. "Land"
The Hess court first notes the use of the word 'land" in the
granting clause, "rather than [a] mere use of the land."'16 3 The

court views the inclusion of "land" as a sign that the grantors
intended to create a defeasible fee. At the same time, however,
the record shows that the deed at issue in Norton conveyed a
"tract or parcel of land,"164 and that in Zahner the deed conveyed "portions of lots three and four."'165 Given that both Norton and Zahner found those deeds to have created easements,
the Hess court erred in constructing 'land" as necessarily indicative of a fee interest.
2. "So Long As"
The court next pointed to use of the phrase "so long as" in
the habendum clause as further evidence of its conclusion, stating that "the phrase 'so long as' is typically used in a conveyance of a fee simple determinable."' 166 However, it failed to
mention that the same "so long as" language was also a part of
the Norton deed. 167 Indeed, the court in Norton viewed this
phrase simply as proof of the railroad's limited permissible use
for the land in question. 168
3. "Right-of-Way"
While the court devotes substantially more time to its discussion of the phrase "for Right-of-way and for Railway Purposes" contained in the habendum clause, it ultimately con-

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn. 2004).
Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry., 151 N.W. 907, 908 (Minn. 1915).
Chi. Great W. R.R. v. Zahner, 177 N.W. 350, 350 (Minn. 1920).
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424.
Norton, 151 N.W. at 908.
Id.
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cludes that its inclusion is simply indecisive.169 In contrast, the
Norton court held that the language "as a right-of-way for
tracks and side tracks and a railroad way" evidenced the parties' intent to convey the right-of-way for a limited use only. 170
In that case, because such language appeared in the habendum
clause, the court found it indicative of the "limitations upon the
estate granted."'171 Instead of following Norton's lead, however,
the Hess court deemed the usage of "right-of-way" in this case
to be a "purpose" rather than a limitation on the type of estate,
which allowed the court to sidestep Norton's precedent. 172
4.

Snow Fences

One unique aspect of the 1898 deed is a provision allowing
the railroad to erect portable snow fences within 150 feet of the
center line of the right-of-way. The deed specifies: "And with
the right to said Company, its successors and assigns to protect
cuts which may be made on said lands, by erecting on both
sides of, or within one hundred and fifty feet from the said center line, Portable snow Fences."'1 73 The court concludes that because this language is separate from the rest of the deed and
clearly specifies a "right" being conveyed (and therefore an
easement), the parties must have understood the distinction
between their language here and in the main granting clause,
and the main granting language must therefore have been intended to be a fee. 174 One obvious fact behind this clause, however, is missing from the court's analysis: snow fences are not
necessary during all months of the year. According to the deed,
the snow fences are not permanent, but are "portable" and
therefore temporary. In fact, the deed specifies that the snow
fences may only be in place from October through May each
winter. 7 5 As a result, this provision is equally susceptible of
another interpretation: that the snow fences are contained in a
separate, more limited clause because they necessitate a separate and more limited easement than the railroad right-of-way
itself.

169. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 425.
170. Norton, 151 N.W. at 908.
171.

Id.

172.
173.
174.
175.

Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id.
See Hess Deed, at 3 (1898) (photocopy of original on file with author).
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5. Dower Rights
The court next relies on the relinquishment of dower rights
in the 1898 deed as further evidence of an intent to convey a fee
simple estate. 176 The court's logic, however, contains an inherent flaw. While a husband was not entitled to rob his wife of
her dower rights unilaterally, it was firmly established that
"where a wife joins her husband in a deed by signing it, it will
operate as a valid relinquishment of her dower, [even if] the
body of the deed does not describe her as grantor, or name her
or her dower."'1 77 Consequently, if the grantors had created a

fee simple estate, dower rights would have been automatically
relinquished with the inclusion of the wives' signatures, and
the clause specifically addressing dower rights would be superfluous. However, the creation of an easement, as something less
than an estate in property, would not affect dower rights. As a
result, the express relinquishment of dower rights in the deed
more likely than not demonstrates that the parties understood
that they were conveying less than a fee estate.
Additionally, the inclusion of a provision specifically relinquishing dower rights is logical in the context of a railroad conveyance. As the railroad company was about to make a substantial investment in the right-of-way cut from this and many
other tracts of land, it undoubtedly required dependability in
each section of its right-of-way. If Harriet Walker, Clotilde
Joyce, or any other woman retaining rights to the property
along the line had decided to assert their full dower rights upon
the death of their husbands, it would have been fatal to the entire rail line.
6. "Excepting and Reserving" in a Subsequent Deed
Finally, the court looked to a 1901 deed from the Joyces
conveying "land in Hubbard County adjacent to the railway
corridor created by the 1898 deed."'178 After describing the land
being conveyed, this deed provided, "[e]xcepting and reserving
therefrom the land heretobefore conveyed to the Park Rapids
and Leech Lake Railway and to the Brainerd and Northern
Minnesota Railway for right-of-way."'179 The Hess court interpreted this to be additional evidence of the parties' original in176.
177.
178.
179.

See id.
THOMPSON, supra note 162, § 370, at 527.
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 426.
Id.
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tent to create a fee simple interest in the railroad.18 0 However,
a closer look at the property law doctrine of exceptions and reservations reveals quite the opposite conclusion.
An exception, as used in deeds, withholds from the scope of
the grant something that otherwise would pass to the
grantee. 8 1 A reservation does the same, but creates a right or
interest that did not previously exist. 8 2 The language typically
used to create an exception is "saving and excepting" or simply
"excepting," and that used to create a reservation is
"reserving."' 8 3 Such language as "excepting and reserving" that appears in the 1901 deed is sometimes "used indiscriminately," in
light of only the minor difference between the two.' 84
Most notably, however, an early twentieth-century property treatise revealed that a common usage for reservations
had developed in application to easements, so that "easements
are... said to be reserved."'1 5 Consequently, in contrast to the
Minnesota Supreme Court's understanding of the exceptions
and reservations doctrine, this clause actually provides evidence that the Joyces did not believe they had conveyed a fee
simple interest to the right-of-way at issue. If they had believed
that the 1898 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad, they would
have instead excluded from the description of land in the second deed that portion comprising the railroad right-of-way.18 6
The land occupied by the right-of-way would have been irrelevant to the subsequent deed. Instead, the inclusion of the "excepting and reserving" clause denotes that something less than
a fee interest (i.e. an easement) already existed on that portion
of land so described.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE
COURT'S INTERPRETATION
While the Minnesota Supreme Court succeeded in holding
the Paul Bunyan State Trail together in State v. Hess, the longterm effect of its analysis will be to send a message to the
180. Id.
181.

THOMPSON, supranote 162, § 310, at 447.

182. Id. at 448.
183. Id. at 449.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 449.
186. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the land covered by
the 1901 deed was only "adjacent" to the railroad right-of-way and not intersected by it. See State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 426 (Minn. 2004).
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state's landowners and courts that deed interpretation need not
rely on settled law, and that the outcome of a case may well depend on the public policy preferences of a given judge. This will
do little to prevent countless landowners from retrieving the
old deeds relevant to their lands and challenging the state's
purported ownership of rail-trails. 8 7 By working so hard to distinguish the elements in Hess from past precedent, the only
principle likely to be of use in future cases is the wellestablished rule of interpretation that "[t]o determine the nature of the conveyance at issue, we look to the deed to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the parties to the instrument."'8 8 The results may range from unforeseeable litigation
costs for the state at best, to a mandated and prohibitively expensive compensation regime for abutting landowners at
worst.'8 9 If the State of Minnesota were forced to reimburse pri-

vate parties at fair market value for the taking of their lands,
the overwhelming cost would likely shut down the trails permanently.

90

Of particular concern now is the question of how to interpret railroad conveyances, given that the Hess deed, determined to be a fee simple determinable, is "virtually identical" to
187. Following the court of appeals decision in favor of the private landowners, a Minnesota newspaper quoted an attorney involved in the case as
saying, "[tihe ramification is that a lot more ancient deeds will become bones
of contention.... It will raise questions as to the validity of title to all of the
trails that are in existence now." Minnesota Court of Appeals: DNR Loses Dispute over Trail Ownership, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 12, 2003, at 2B
(quoting attorney Peter Seed). The following day, another Minnesota newspaper reported that a group of 100 to 150 landowners along another state railtrail had retained counsel to look into the possibility of legal action similar to
that involved in Hess. Michelle Tan, Ruling Rekindles Wobegon Dispute, ST.
CLOUD TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at lB.

188. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423.
189. For an in-depth discussion of nationwide litigation underway surrounding rails-to-trails cases, see Litigation and Its Effect on the Rails-toTrails Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin.
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter
Rails-to-TrailsHearing]. At that hearing, Thomas L. Sansonetti, assistant attorney general with the U.S. Department of Justice, stated that, "[t]he number
of rails-to-trails cases that the Environment Division handles has increased
dramatically in the last few years. In 1990, we had one case, with one claimant. Now we have 17 cases, scattered across the nation, with approximately
4,550 claimants." Id. at 14.
190. Of the thirteen major trails promoted by the Minnesota DNR on its
Web site, at least ten are constructed upon old railroad rights-of-way. See
MINNESOTA DNR, STATE TRAILS LIST, at http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/state-

trails/list.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
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the Norton deed, determined to be merely an easement. 191
While in many instances the more recent holding should control, cases that require a finding of original intent from an earlier time period are unique. In these cases, the holding more
accurately reflecting the original intent is the one decided
closer in time to original conveyance, because the earlier court
presumably has a better understanding of contemporaneous
law and prevailing social mores. Since the very foundation of
our property law is an adherence to the intent expressed in a
deed, 192 the Minnesota Supreme Court created a troublesome
dilemma for similar disputed deeds in the future: either find in
favor of original intent or follow Hess.
V. OTHER PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING THE
RAILS-TO-TRAILS PROBLEM
A. A MULTIPRONG TEST FOR DEED INTERPRETATION
The Minnesota Supreme Court could have used Hess to establish a multiprong balancing test based on deed elements
that have arisen in prior Minnesota cases interpreting railroad
conveyances. This proposal would serve to substantiate the
reasonableness of landowners' expectations in bringing quiet
title actions against trail operators by allowing courts to sift
through competing land ownership claims in a more principled
manner. In addition, such a test would help to increase predictability for litigants within the state courts by allowing them to
more easily assess the validity of their claims.
The Supreme Court of Washington adopted this approach
in Brown v. State,193 and since then, other cases have followed
its lead and relied on the same set of factors. 194 The test articulated in Brown instructs courts to examine such factors as the
purpose for the conveyance; whether the deed conveyed a strip
of land for a limited use; whether it created a right-of-way over
land; whether it granted only a limited right to construct, operate, or maintain a railroad; whether it created a right of reverter; whether the consideration was substantial or nominal;
191. "To begin, we turn to Norton, the precedent of our court that interprets virtually identical deed language as that at issue here." Hess, 684
N.W.2d at 429 (Blatz, C.J., dissenting).
192. See, e.g., id. at 423.
193. 924 P.2d 908, 912 (Wash. 1996) (en banc).
194. See, e.g., King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir.
2002); Ray v. King County, 86 P.3d 183, 187 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
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and whether the deed contained a habendum clause. 195 In addition, the Missouri Court of Appeals recently applied its own
balancing test to a rails-to-trails dispute, examining "(1)
whether the deed includes language conveying a 'right-of-way';
(2) the amount of consideration; and (3) language196in the deed
limiting the use of the land for railroad purposes."'
Opponents of a balancing test for railroad conveyances
might argue that it has the potential to lose sight of original intent in favor of modern judicial efficiency and consistency.
However, by effectively examining prior case law such as Norton and Zahner and maintaining the measure of flexibility
normally built into such a test, the Minnesota courts would be
able to apply it without straying from the law at the time such
deeds were created. In addition, by relying on rules of construction as they stood when the deeds were written, courts would
be more likely to accurately reflect the intent of original grantors.
In Minnesota, therefore, a balancing test might include (1)
whether the deed contains the phrase "right-of-way" or other
language indicating a purpose for the conveyance; 197 (2)
whether the habendum clause uses "forever," rather than more
narrow, limiting language; 198 and (3) whether the width and
shape of the land at issue would serve any use other than a
railroad right-of-way in such a form. 199 Each of these three elements was raised in previous Minnesota cases dealing with
railroad conveyances, which makes them obvious choices for a
balancing test. However, the court could also add further elements that it considers both well-settled and fundamental to a
railroad deed inquiry.
The effect of a firmer test such as this would be significant
for the consistency of land ownership disputes and the overall
amount of rails-to-trails litigation. Such a balancing test creates a more predictable regime of deed interpretation and takings compensation and reduces the government's overall cost of
the rails-to-trails program. Litigation surrounding rails-totrails has increased sharply since 1990, now constituting one of
195. Brown, 924 P.2d at 912.
196. Moore v. Mo. Friends of the Wabash Trace Nature Trail, Inc., 991
S.W.2d 681, 685-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).

197. Chi. Great W. R.R. v. Zahner, 177 N.W. 350, 350 (Minn. 1920); Norton
v. Duluth Transfer Ry., 151 N.W. 907, 908 (Minn. 1915).
198. Norton, 151 N.W. at 908.
199. Id.; Zahner, 177 N.W. at 350.
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the formidable costs to the system, 20 0 and without further
changes from courts or legislatures, there is no sign that this
trend will cease. As a public policy matter, the federal rails-totrails program was originally estimated to cost the federal government nothing but has instead resulted in "complex and resource-intensive litigation [and] significant Federal budgetary
20 1
concerns."
B. POLICY PREFERENCE AS APPLIED TO AMBIGUOUS DEEDS

The Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Hess, though
legally troublesome, was hailed as a victory for public policy.
After the court decided the case, a Minnesota newspaper cited
three main reasons for its satisfaction with the court's ruling. 20 2
First, the court's conclusion served to reopen the Paul Bunyan
State Trail to full, unobstructed use. 203 Second, the decision

would help prevent similar threats to the state's rail-trails. 204
Finally, the ruling served as an adequate rebuff to "a meanspirited obstruction by a few landowners who can be fairly described as spiteful." 20 5
Although the court purported to reach its decision on the
basis of the 1898 deed and other extrinsic evidence, a closer
look at the opinion reveals undeniable public policy underpinnings. The article by Danaya Wright and Jeffrey Hester, from
which the court drew two lengthy citations in its footnotes, provides a clear example of this position. 206 The Hess dissent also
recognized this theme, stating that:

200. See supra text accompanying note 189.
201. Rails-to-Trails Hearing,supra note 189, at 3 (statement of Bob Barr,
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law).
202. Paul Bunyan Trail: A Win for Users-and Taxpayers, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Aug. 1, 2004, at AA4. Another article from a Minnesota newspaper had similarly stated in 2003 that, "[b]e it biking, hiking, horses or motorized vehicles, Minnesotans love their public recreational trails. That's why
more than 1300 miles of such trails exist statewide." Our View: State's Recreation TrailsMust Be Saved, ST. CLOUD TIMES, Sept. 24, 2003, at 5B.
203. Paul Bunyan Trail: A Win for Users-andTaxpayers, supra note 202.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. The Wright & Hester article, in a portion not cited by the court, argues that, "[t]he better approach is to interpret the deed to convey fee simple
absolute to the railroad, or a defeasible fee that converts to a fee simple absolute through destruction of the reversion." Wright & Hester, supra note 108, at
384. For context within the case and the specific quotes used, see State v.
Hess, 684 N.W.2d 441, 421-22 nn.6-7 (Minn. 2004).
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the majority's over-reliance on one law review article to support its
public policy reasoning is troubling, particularly when taken in combination with the nonexistent and/or meaningless distinctions it
makes when comparing similar deed language and the decided case
law. Our responsibility is to decide the issues at hand in the context
of the law as it is. To hold otherwise is to overturn previous case law,
207
and the majority admits no such alteration in the law.

The consequence of the court's reasoning, as outlined above,
will likely be to compromise precisely those public policy interests which the court sought to uphold. An approach that clearly
acknowledged a policy preference for otherwise ambiguous
deeds would yield a more permanent solution for the state
rails-to-trails system and align state law more closely with federal law, which already contains a stated public policy interest
20 8
in the trails.
An analogous statement of public policy preference appears
in several Indiana Supreme Court cases. 209 There, the court
adopted a policy in 1964 of resolving any ambiguity in deeds in
favor of the original grantors, and thus in favor of finding
easements. 210 The court's reasoning behind establishing this
policy involved a determination that, after abandonment for the
intended purposes, "such severance [of the right-of-way from
surrounding property] generally operates adversely to the normal and best use of all the property involved. '2 11 Several cases
since that time have reaffirmed the policy and applied it to a
variety of deeds. 2 12
In a similar way, the Minnesota Supreme Court could have
articulated a public policy preference that the conversion of
former rail lines into recreational trails operates as the "normal
and best use of all the property involved." By doing so, it could
dictate to lower courts that, in cases of irreconcilable ambigu-

207. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 433 (Blatz, C.J., dissenting). In addition, the
Wright & Hester article was cited by a federal district court specifically addressing policy reasons for its support of the shifting public uses doctrine.
Hynek v. MCI World Communications, 202 F. Supp. 2d 831, 838 (N.D. Ind.
2002).
208. See supra note 21 (discussing the federal law).
209. See Hefty v. All Other Members of the Certified Settlement Class, 680
N.E.2d 843, 855 (Ind. 1997); Brown v. Penn Cent. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 641, 644
(Ind. 1987); Consol. Rail Corp., v. Lewellen, 666 N.E.2d 958, 962 (Ind. App.
1996).
210. Ross, Inc. v. Legler, 199 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ind.1964).
211. Id.
212. See Hefty, 680 N.E.2d at 855; Brown, 510 N.E.2d at 644; Lewellen, 666
N.E.2d at 962.
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ity, old railroad deeds are to be interpreted in favor of the
grantee railroads where there is an important public interest in
the use or preservation of the corridor. 213 To simultaneously
protect the trails and safeguard the rights of private landowners, the court might, for example, limit the scope of irreconcilably ambiguous cases to those containing reference to 'land" as
well as a "right."214 Such a line of reasoning would establish a
more principled way to distinguish past precedent such as Norton and Zahner from modern cases like Hess in which arguably
very different interests are at stake. In addition, this approach
would likely serve the court's public policy ends better than any
other because of the unpredictable ambiguity contained in
215
many railroad conveyances.
One additional benefit to this policy is its conformance with
landowners' reasonable expectations. Indeed, two principal reasons for the public's lack of sympathy toward the abutting
landowner-plaintiffs in Hess were repeatedly cited. First, many
considered their blockading tactics "mean-spirited." 2 16 Second,
many people also felt that, under the circumstances in which
they acquired the land in question, it was unreasonable for the
landowners to expect that the strips of land would revert to
their possession. One of the families involved in the suit
against the DNR owns three parcels of land along the Paul
Bunyan State Trail. 217 The family purchased the first of the
parcels while the railroad was still in use and the other two after the state trail was already open. 218 The other landowner involved also purchased his tract of land after the trail had
opened. 219 He bought the land from his parents, who had owned
it while the railroad was still in operation. 220 The main point of
such an argument, therefore, is that a finding in favor of such
landowners would create an undesirable windfall in their favor.
213. The popularity of rail-trails around the country is well-documented.
The Rails-to-Trails Conservancy estimates that "over 100 million Americans
use rail-trails, of which there are more than 1000 nationwide for a total of
more than 11,000 miles of trails." See Rails-to-Trails Hearing, supranote 189,
at 15 (prepared statement of Thomas L. Sansonetti, Department of Justice).
214. See Korpela, supra note 18, § 3a.
215. See supranotes 25-28 and accompanying text.
216. See Paul Bunyan Trail: A Win for Users--and Taxpayers, supra note
202.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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A public policy in favor of trail use for ambiguous deeds would
go a long way to prevent this.
C. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
While an explicit public policy alternative may have been
one possibility for the Minnesota Supreme Court at the time it
was deciding Hess, an effective solution to the problem now
would be a state legislative act analogous to the statement of
public policy in the National Trails System Act. That Act expressly acknowledges "the ever-increasing outdoor recreation
needs of an expanding population and [the need for] the preservation of, public access to, travel within, and enjoyment and
appreciation of the open-air, outdoor areas and historic re22 1
sources of the Nation."
In addition, the State's legislature is in a unique position to
create a more flexible law addressing railroad deeds. To accommodate the possibility that the public interest may shift
over time, the legislature could pass a statement similar to that
in Indiana by declaring that interpretation of ambiguous instruments should be resolved in favor of "the normal and best
use of all the property involved." 222 In this way, one might be
able to reconcile Hess with prior case law, where a finding in
favor of the railroad would not have conformed with prevailing
land use policy and would have severely disrupted the parties'
expectations.
One further solution that would aid courts in reaching
principled decisions in rails-to-trails cases is a law prescribing
rules of construction for ambiguous deeds. For example, under
New Jersey law, "[e]very deed conveying lands shall, unless an
exception be made therein, be construed to include all the estate, right, title, interest, use, possession, property, claim, and
demand whatsoever, both in law and equity, of the grantor, including the fee simple if he had such an estate."22 3 As applied to
rails-to-trails controversies, such a law would allow courts to
find that a fee simple absolute passed to the railroad whenever
the deed specified a conveyance of "land." In addition, this
would still allow for fair compensation in cases in which deeds
refer to a mere "right," since those instruments would not fall
within the scope of such a statute.

221.
222.
223.

National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241(a) (2000).
Ross, Inc. v. Legler, 199 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ind. 1964).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-13 (West 2003).
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CONCLUSION
State v. Hess succeeded in holding the Paul Bunyan State
Trail together for now, drawing significant praise from many
corners of the press and public. However, to the extent the
Minnesota Supreme Court hoped to save the Paul Bunyan
State Trail and shield the State's recreational trails from similar attacks in the future, its analysis and reasoning may actually disserve the public policy it seeks to protect. The court's
decision will likely have the unforeseen effect of encouraging
greater property dispute litigation, while at the same time leaving the State's courts with few answers to the problems presented in such cases. By examining the parties' original intent
but reaching different conclusions on nearly all factors than
contemporaneous cases or property law doctrines would instruct, the court created a legal void. It did not overrule Norton
and Zahner, yet strayed too far from such case law to afford
lower courts any sound notion of how to interpret similar deeds
in the future.
A more desirable approach would have been the presentation of a principled set of guidelines with which to evaluate future rails-to-trails cases or, alternatively, an honest acknowledgement of a public policy preference. At this point in time,
though, it is vital to the future of Minnesota's trail system that
the State's legislature take up the issue and examine creative
solutions for such cases. As the nation's leader in rails-trails,
Minnesota is now at an opportune juncture to pave the way for
unique responses to the growing cost of rails-to-trails litigation.
As our society's standard of living grows ever more comfortable and individuals are increasingly able to choose greater
recreation time over more work, the demand for scenic and historic trails will only continue to increase into the foreseeable
future. "[G]eneration Xers have certain expectations.., to have
a large amount of free time. They don't want to be workaholics.... And what do they want to do with that free time?

They're going to spend it at the Y[MCA]. They're going to spend
it on the bike paths."224 At the same time, however, old deeds

and claims to title will continue to be brought forward and into
the courts, which will inevitably necessitate a more principled
approach to adjudicating competing interests. Consequently,
Minnesota and other states would be wise to consider this big
224. Jonathan Roos, City Views Super-Yas Major Draw,DES MOINES REG.,
May 15, 2000, at lB.
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picture and to search for innovative alternatives that reconcile
legitimate public and private interests in former railroad
rights-of-way.

